Security v Privacy in the Context of Surveillance Measures – Creating “Glass Citizens” by Liebelt, Franziska
 1 
 
 
Faculty of Law  
Victoria University of Wellington  
 
 
 
 
 
Security v Privacy  
in the Context of Surveillance Measures –  
Creating “Glass Citizens”  
 
 
 
 
LLM Research Paper  
Counter-Terrorism Law (LAWS 545) 
 
 
Franziska Liebelt  
 
  
 2 
 
Content 
 
I INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 4 
II THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SECURITY AND PRIVACY ................................. 5 
III THE CASE OF EAVESDROPPING IN GERMAN PRIVATE HOMES .............. 6 
A History of Counter-Terrorism Law in Germany ...................................................... 6 
B Structure of Counter-Terrorism Law in Germany ................................................... 6 
C The 1998 Legislative Change to Allow Eavesdropping in Private Homes .............. 7 
1 Changes to Article 13 Grundgesetz ............................................................. 8 
2 Changes to the Strafprozessordnung .......................................................... 8 
D Der Grosse Lauschangriff before the BVerfG ........................................................... 9 
1 Changes to Art 13 Grundgesetz ................................................................. 10 
2 Changes to the Strafprozessordnung ........................................................ 11 
3 The dissenting opinion ................................................................................ 14 
4 Evaluation.................................................................................................... 16 
E Legislative Changes Following the Judgment ......................................................... 17 
IV THE NEW ZEALAND GCSB AMENDMENT BILL ............................................ 18 
A The GSCB Act 2003 ................................................................................................... 18 
B The GCSB Amendment Bill 2013 ............................................................................. 19 
C The Degree of Intrusion into Privacy Rights ........................................................... 21 
1 Privacy rights in New Zealand .................................................................. 22 
2 How intrusive is the new GCSB Act? ....................................................... 24 
D Comparison to the German Case Study ................................................................... 25 
V CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 26 
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................................... 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Abstract  
 
During the last decades states have internationally increased their surveillance 
measures. Surveillance has become increasingly systematic and integrated in our 
everyday life. This development was intensified by several terror attacks, specifically the 
event of 9/11. Surveillance by the state always comes along with the intrusion of privacy 
rights of individuals. Both privacy and security are essential for a functioning society. To 
find the right balance between the two interests and to uphold the protection of privacy 
rights when the threat of terror seems to justify increasingly intrusive measures is 
difficult but of great importance. This paper looks at two examples of legislations that 
increased states possibilities for surveillance and how the balance between security and 
privacy was struck in those legislations. It compares the degree of protection given to 
privacy rights in a state with a codified constitution, Germany, and in a state with no 
codified constitution, New Zealand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The text of this paper (excluding footnotes, table of contents, headings and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 7 800 words. 
 
Abbreviations: 
BVerfG – Bundesverfassungsgericht – Federal Constitutional Court  
StGB – Strafgesetzbuch – Criminal Code  
StPO – Strafprozessordnung – Code of Criminal Procedure 
 
German provisions are cited as follows:  
§ for sections   
Roman numbers for subsections  
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I Introduction  
The conflict between personal rights of liberty and states’ interest in security is an issue 
deeply inherent in counter-terrorism law.1 During the last decades governments have 
globally increased the possibilities for the surveillance of individuals, justified on the 
grounds that this will enable a better protection from security threats.2 This movement 
wasn’t sparked, but definitely inflamed by the 9/11 attacks. The threat by terrorism was 
suddenly perceived as more eminent than ever before. During the last decades the 
impression has been shaped that citizens need to give up part of their liberties if they 
want to be protected from terrorist threats. One of these liberties is the right to move 
about one’s life without being “spied” on by the state. Counter-terrorism laws include 
provisions that give increasing rights to states to collect data of its citizens through 
diverse technologies, such as eavesdropping, internet searches or surveillance of phone 
data.3 Passing these laws means taking away more and more liberty rights of the citizens. 
In Germany this phenomenon has become known as “der gläserne Bürger” which 
translates to the “glass citizen”. This paper analyses the relationship between personal 
freedom and privacy and security in the context of two national legislations. The first one 
is a legislative change made in Germany in 1998 increasing the possibilities for 
eavesdropping for the investigation of particular crimes. This legislative change was 
challenged before the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2004. The court struck 
down parts of the legislative package. The second legislation looked at in this paper is the 
GCSB Amendment Bill recently passed in New Zealand, which changes the GCSB Act 
2003. The changes introduced by the Amendment Bill extent the Security Bureau’s 
powers in regards to surveillance measures.  
 
This paper first analyses these two examples of increased surveillance measures. It then 
assesses how the balance between security and privacy was struck in the two examples 
and whether any particular differences can be found. The comparison is conducted in 
light of the fact that Germany has a codified constitution, while New Zealand does not.   
 
  
1  Verena Zöller “Liberty Dies by Inches: German Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights” 
(2004) 4 German L J 469, at 471. 
2  Kirstie Ball and Frank Webster The Intensification of Surveillance. Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in 
the Information Age (Pluto Press, London, 2003) at 1 and Jacqueline Klosek The War On Privacy 
(Praeger, Westport, 2007) at 155. 
3  Clive Walker “Keeping Control of Terrorists without Losing Control of Constitutionalism” in David 
Dyzenhaus (ed) Civil Rights and Security (Ashgate, Surrey, 2009) 331, at 332 and Michael Levi and 
David S Wall “Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post-9/11 European Information Society” 
(2004) 31(2) Journal of Law and Society 194, at 199 to 205. 
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II The conflict between security and privacy 
Liberty and security are two aspects that are fundamentally important in democratic 
societies.4 Guaranteeing personal liberties is an intrinsic part of democratic systems and 
one of these liberties is the right “to be left alone” by the state.5 While there is yet no 
comprehensive definition of the term “privacy”,6 the concept of privacy constitutes “the 
chore of human dignity, autonomy and freedom.”7 Or, in the words of Tipping J:8  
 
It is the essence of dignity and personal autonomy and well-being of all human 
beings that some aspects of their lives should be able to remain private if they so 
wish. 
 
In Germany this is clearly reflected in its constitution. Art 2 I GG reads: “Everyone has 
the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of 
others or offend against the constitutional order or against morality.” Due to Germany’s 
historical experience with two regimes that did not provide fundamental civil rights and 
liberties, German citizens are still particularly sensitive to intrusions by the state.9  
 
At the same time it is the state’s responsibility to keep its citizens safe.10 National 
security is one of the paramount interests of a society.11 There will always be a tension 
between these two goals in democratic societies. This conflict is particularly strong in 
counter-terrorism legislation. It is the state’s responsibility to find the right balance.12  
 
  
4  Zöller, above n 1, at 471. 
5  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193 at 195. 
6  Emanuel Gross “The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism – Protection of Human Rights: The 
Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest – the Proper Balance” (2004) 37 Cornell Int’l L J 27 at 31. 
7  Donna-Maree Cross “Surveillance” in Stephen Penk and Rosemary Tobin (eds) Privacy Law in New 
Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2010) 133 at 135. 
8  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [239] as per Tipping J.  
9  Zöller, above n 1, at 472. 
10  Jacqueline Klosek The War On Privacy (Praeger, Westport, 2007) at 155 and 156. 
11  Thomas I Emerson “Symposium: National Security and Civil Liberties” (1983-4) 69 Cornell L Rev 685 
at 685. 
12  Jeremy Waldron “Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance” in Dyzenhaus (ed) Civil Rights and 
Security (Ashgate, Surrey, 2009) 3, at 4. 
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III The Case of Eavesdropping in German Private Homes  
A History of Counter-Terrorism Law in Germany  
Although the German counter terrorism law was, like all over the world, revisited after 
the assault on 9 September 2001, it originates from as early as the 1970s.13 At that time, 
Germany was facing several assaults by the violent left wing movement “Rote Armee 
Fraktion”14 which peaked in the so called “German autumn” in 1977. It was then, that the 
constitutional discourse about the right amount of restriction of freedom in favour of 
safety occurred for the first time.15 Immediately after the 9 September 2001 two 
legislative packages called the “Safety Packages” or “Anti-Terror-Packages” were 
adopted, which included both amendments to existing laws and new provisions.16 These 
laws were drafted and adopted quickly and without fundamental research on possible 
flaws of existing laws and the reality of threats in Germany.17 These changes were not so 
much reactions to the concrete threats of particular terrorists but stemmed from a more 
general fear of a new type of terrorist activity, a vague phenomenon of an ever-present 
threat.18 The major difference between the terroristic movement of the 1970s and the 
attack in New York was that the 1970s’ terrorists were identified individuals. The 
terrorists involved in the attack in New York on the other hand were perceived as 
representatives of a large terroristic network that could strike any time anywhere.19 This 
difference explains why the new legislative actions were seen as necessary, even though 
terrorism itself had been a long known phenomenon in Germany and Europe.20  
B Structure of Counter-Terrorism Law in Germany  
The pivotal provision in the German counter-terrorism law is § 129a Strafgesetzbuch21 
(StGB), which was enacted in 1976.22 This provision punishes the formation of terrorist 
  
13  Oliver Lepsius “Freiheit, Sicherheit und Terror: Die Rechtslage in Deutschland (2004) 32(1) Leviathan 
64, at 64.  
14  Red Armee Fraction.  
15  Lepsius, above n 13, at 64. 
16  Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz), 9 Januar 
2002 and Lepsius, above n 13, at 64. 
17  Lepsius, above n 13, at 65 and 66. 
18  Lepsius, above n 13, at 66 and Erhard Denninger “Freiheit durch Sicherheit? Anmerkungen zum 
Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz” (2002) (10-11) APuZ 22, at 22.   
19  Lepsius, above n 13, at 67. 
20  Lepsius, above n 13, at 67. 
21  Criminal Code. 
22  Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuchs, der Strafprozeßordnung, des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes, 
der Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung und des Strafvollzugsgesetzes 1976. 
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organisations with a prison sentence of 1 to 10 years. It defines a terrorist organisation as 
an organisation which is founded for the purpose of particular crimes listed in the 
provision. These crimes include murder, manslaughter, genocide, particular types of 
abduction, crimes against humanity, war crimes and many more. The provision does not 
only penalise the act of founding such an organisation but also the mere involvement with 
one. § 129b StGB extends the applicability of § 129a to terrorist organisations abroad. 
These provisions are cited in many provisions of the Strafprozessordnung23 (StPO) to 
allow certain procedural measures, such as phone tapping.  
 
Apart from these central provisions in the StGB a number of legislative packages making 
amendments to existing provisions were passed in the 1970s and after the attack of the 11 
September 2001.24 The central legislative packages were the previously mentioned 
“security packages” I and II. The first of these concentrated on few restrictive measures, 
while the second, much more extensive one, focused on preventive measures, and mainly 
extended the powers of security services and allowed stricter controls of immigrants.25  
Between 2001 and 2008 a total of 26 legislations and international agreements have been 
passed in the “fight against terrorism”.26  
C The 1998 Legislative Change to Allow Eavesdropping in Private Homes  
Concerning the German legal situation, this paper focuses on some legislative changes 
that were made in 1998 “for the combat against organised crime”. These legislative 
changes included two different laws: The “Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes 
(Artikel 13)”27 and the “Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung der Organisierten 
Kriminalität”.28 The first of these changed art 13 Grundgesetz29 (GG) to build the 
constitutional foundation for eavesdropping in private homes, while the latter added 
corresponding procedural provisions to the StPO. While these new provisions were not 
  
23  Code of Criminal Procedure. 
24  Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Ersten Gesetzes zur Reform des Strtafrechts 1974; Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Strafgesetzbuchs, der Strafprozeßordnung, des Gerichtsverfassungsgesetzes, der 
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung und des Strafvollzugsgesetzes 1976; Gesetz zur Änderung der 
Strafprozessordnung 1978 and Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus 
(Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) 2002. 
25  Lepsius, above n 13, at 68 to 70. 
26  http://www.bmj.de/DE/Buerger/buergerMenschrechte/AntiTerrorGesetze/_node.html. 
27  Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 13) 1998 (Legislation for the Amendment of the 
Constitution). 
28  Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Bekämpfung der Organisierten Kriminalität 1998 (Legislation for 
Improvement of the Combat against Organised Crimes). 
29  Constitution.  
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officially aimed at terrorist organisations, they constitute part of the general movement 
towards increasingly intrusive laws that interfere with personal rights of liberty and 
privacy.30 This legislative change became widely known as the “großer Lauschangriff”.31 
1 Changes to Article 13 Grundgesetz  
Article 13 GG declares the inviolability of the private home and constitutes a 
specification of the general right of personality protected by art 2 I GG in connection with 
art 1 I GG, which again is closely connected to the right to human dignity. The right of 
inviolability of the private home constitutes a so called defensive right of the individual 
against intrusions into the home by acts of the state.32 It protects the right to be “left 
alone” in the spatial area of one’s home.33  
 
Before the 1998 amendments, the article had 3 paragraphs. These declared the 
inviolability of the private home and only allowed searches by order of a judge and by 
order of other authorities in cases of imminent danger. The amendments to art 13 GG 
added four paragraphs to the Article that allow eavesdropping in private homes. The main 
paragraph is the new paragraph 3 which stipulates that:  
 
If particular facts establish the suspicion that someone has committed a particularly 
serious crime listed in a national law, technical devices of acoustic surveillance may 
be used for the persecution of the crime in apartments in which the accused 
presumably sojourns, if the investigation into the situation would otherwise be 
disproportionately aggravated or become vain. The measure must be terminable. The 
order is made by a body of three judges. In cases of imminent danger the order can 
be made by a single judge. 
 
This change introduced a new constitutional exception to the inviolability of the home 
and allows for the national legislator to specify the new powers of the authorities.  
2 Changes to the Strafprozessordnung  
The amendments to the StPO contained procedural rules around the surveillance under 
the new art 13 III GG. These rules constitute the “national law” mentioned in art 13 III 
GG. The central provisions in these changes were § 100c I No 3, II and III StPO. Under § 
  
30  Zöller, above n 1, at 484 and 485.  
31  “Big eavesdrop attack”. 
32  Theodor Maunz and Günter Düring (founders) Grundgesetz Kommentar (68 ed) (CH Beck, München, 
2013) at Art 13 mn 1. 
33  Verfassungsmäßigkeit handwerksrechtlicher Besichtigungsrechte (1971) (32) BVerfGE 54, 75.  
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100c III No 3 “the not publicly spoken word of the accused may be eavesdropped and 
recorded with technical devices, if particular facts establish the suspicion that the suspect 
has committed particular crimes” listed in the provision and if the investigation into the 
situation would otherwise be disproportionately aggravated or become vain. The 
catalogue of crimes included crimes that are typical for organised criminals, such as 
money laundering, human trafficking, murder and manslaughter, crimes against the 
personal freedom, robbery, blackmailing, a number of crimes against the state, leadership 
of a terrorist organisation and many more. Under § 100c II the eavesdropping is also 
allowed in homes of other persons than the suspect, if particular facts suggest that the 
suspect sojourns in these homes, the measures in the home of the suspect are not enough 
to investigate the case or determine the whereabouts of the suspect and the investigation 
would otherwise be disproportionately aggravated or become vain. 
D  Der Grosse Lauschangriff before the BVerfG34  
In 2004 several German citizens filed constitutional complaints against these changes. 
Significantly, some well-known German politicians were part of the complaint. One of 
them was the former Minister of Justice, who had resigned when the Government first 
started to discuss the increase of eavesdropping in private homes in 1996. The 
complainants disputed the constitutionality of both the amendments to art 13 GG and the 
amendments to the StPO.35 The core of their arguments was that all new provisions 
constituted an unjustifiable interference with several constitutional rights.36 The main 
invoked constitutional rights were:  
 
- The right to inviolability of the home (art 13 I GG) 
- The right to informational self-determination as part of the general personality 
right (art 2 I in connection with 1 I GG)  
- The right to a judicial process (art 19 IV GG) 
 
The Court decided that the amendment of art 13 GG was in line with the requirements for 
a constitutional amendment but that some of the new procedural arrangements violated 
the personal rights under art 13 I GG and the general right of personality under art 2 I in 
connection with art 1 I GG.  
  
34  BVerfG (2004) 1 BvR 2378/98, 1 BvR 1084/99. 
35  Above, n 34, at [50] and [57]. 
36  At [52] to [55] and [57]. 
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1 Changes to Art 13 Grundgesetz 
The BVerfG started with the assessment of the constitutionality of the changes made to 
art 13 GG. The court first clarified that art 13 I GG does not only protect citizens from 
physical intrusions in its private home but also from other forms of intrusion, facilitated 
by modern technologies.37 It concluded that the new 13 III GG therefore constituted a 
restriction on the rights guaranteed under art 13 I GG.38 The court then moved on to 
assess whether the amendment of art 13 GG was consistent with art 79 GG, which 
stipulates the requirements for constitutional changes.39 The main requirement under the 
provision is that a change of the constitution may not “touch” the principles embodied in 
arts 1 or 20 GG.40 These principles are the right to human dignity (art 1 I GG) and the 
fundamental principles of the Rule of Law and the Social State Principle (art 20 GG). 
Article 1 III GG furthermore refers to all constitutional rights and therefore prohibits the 
infringement of all of these rights in so far as such an infringement would collide with the 
protection of the human dignity guaranteed in art 1 I GG.41  
 
The court first defined the elements that constitute human dignity and concluded that the 
new provisions would infringe this right if it allowed intrusions into the “Kernbereich 
privater Lebensgestaltung”, which translates to the “core sphere of private life”.42 This 
area of ultimate human freedom had been shaped by the BVerfG in the Elfes decision in 
1957 and constitutes the most private sphere of private life which is entirely protected 
from intrusions by the state.43 The core sphere of private life encompasses the possibility 
to express highly personal feelings, impressions, thoughts, opinions and experiences 
without having to fear that the state is eavesdropping on these thoughts. The right to this 
sphere of intimacy requires the existence of a physical area in which an individual can 
express these feelings freely. This area is the private home.44 The court decided that the 
amendments to art 13 III did not violate this right for three reasons. 
 
  
37  At [105]. 
38  At [105]. 
39  At [108] to [156].  
40  Art 79 III GG.  
41  Above, n 34, at [109].  
42  At [122].  
43  Martin Kutscha “Verfassungsrechtlicher Schutz des Kernebreichs privater Lebensgestaltung – nichts 
neues aus Karlsruhe?” (2005) NJW 20, at 20.  
44  Above, n 34, at [120]. 
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Firstly art 13 III GG had to be interpreted in the light of other constitutional provisions.45 
This would lead to a narrow interpretation which does not cause violations of the core 
sphere of private life. Secondly art 13 III merely set up the frame for further national 
legislation which would constitute the true enabling provision. Article 13 III GG only 
allowed such national legislation that was in accordance with all constitutional law and 
did therefore not enable unconstitutional infringements by the state.46 Thirdly the court 
saw sufficient requirements for the national law in art 13 III GG, such as the requirement 
to list certain crimes that would justify eavesdropping, the requirement that the 
investigations would otherwise be disproportionately difficult or in vain, the requirement 
of a judicial warrant and the requirement of a time limitation.47  
2 Changes to the Strafprozessordnung   
After concluding that the changes to art 13 GG were constitutional the court turned to the 
new provisions of the StPO. The judgment includes a detailed assessment of the 
constitutionality of the StPO provisions. The BVerfG has developed a particular pattern 
for such an assessment. Due to the limited scope of this paper, this section will not follow 
this pattern but concentrate on the areas that are most relevant in the context.  
 
 Scope of protection and infringement  
The court first stated the relevant constitutional rights which built the benchmark for the 
constitutionality of the new provision:48  
 
- The inviolability of the home (art 13 I GG)  
- The right to informational self-determination as a sub right of the general right of 
personality (art 2 I in connection with art 1 I) 
 
The BVerfG briefly found that being in your apartment without the surveillance of the 
state was protected by art 13 I GG and, if you are not in your own but someone else’s flat, 
by art 2 I in connection with art 1 I.49 The eavesdropping was therefore found to be an 
infringement of these rights.50  
 
  
45  At [124] and [129] to [134]. 
46  At [114], [124] and [131].  
47  At [126] to [128].  
48  At [158].  
49  At [160] – [162]. 
50  At [164] - [167]. 
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 Justification  
The main part of the Court’s assessment was dedicated to the question of justification for 
these infringements. Here the court assesses whether the provisions conform to pivotal 
constitutional requirements and whether the provisions are proportionate.  
 
(i) The core sphere of private life  
The court started the assessment by determining whether the new provisions of the StPO 
preserved the core sphere of private life, which, it concluded, was only partly the case.51 
The provisions violated the core sphere of private life in so far as they did not prohibit the 
eavesdropping of conversations that were part of this sphere.52 This is true for 
conversations that take place with close family members, other close confidants or 
persons with professions that involve confidentiality.53 A violation of this core sphere is 
always unconstitutional and cannot be justified. The court stated that, in order to be 
constitutional, the provisions needed to prohibit the eavesdropping and recording of such 
conversations and provide for the deletion of such conversations if they were accidently 
recorded.54 Furthermore it had to be guaranteed that such recordings could not be used in 
proceedings.55  
 
(ii) Procedural Protection  
The court made two separate comments on the procedural protection provided for by the 
relevant provisions. The guarantee to procedural protection is embedded in art 19 IV 
sentence 1 GG.56  
 
Firstly, the court found that there was no sufficient procedural protection against the 
eavesdropping measures.57 Because the affected persons are notified of the measure only 
very late or even never, a sufficient procedural protection can only be ensured, if 
automatic review-mechanisms by authorities other than the prosecution authorities are in 
place.58 The BVerfG said that it was necessary for the provisions to include exact 
  
51  At [168]. 
52  At [171]. 
53  At [172]. 
54  At [169] and [179]. 
55  At [180]. 
56  Art 19 IV sentence 1 GG: If someone is violated in his rights by the public power, he has a right to 
judicial process.   
57  At [190] – [194]. 
58  At [191]. 
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regulations on who was in charge of reviewing the admissibility of information gained by 
eavesdropping and that such a review had to happen ex officio.59  
 
Secondly, the court struck down some of the provisions on the notification of affected 
persons.60 The court decided that the StPO provisions violated art 19 IV GG in so far as 
they included an exception for the notification of the affected persons when the 
notification was not possible without a threat to the public security or without 
jeopardizing the further use of a secret agent.61 The court found that the general clause 
“public security” was too wide, because it includes all protected legal rights. The 
legislative had to specify what legal rights exactly needed to be affected in order to justify 
not notifying the affected person.62 
 
(iii) List of crimes  
The BVerfG further examined whether the enumerated crimes in § 100c III No 3 StPO 
were consistent with art 13 III GG, which allows eavesdropping measures only in cases 
of “particularly serious crimes”. The court said that the catalogue of crimes included in 
§100c III No 3 StPO seemed arbitrary, as the list included crimes with varying severity of 
penalties, different protected legal interests and different degrees of wrongdoing.63 
Because eavesdropping constituted a particularly grave intrusion into constitutional 
rights, this measure needed to be limited by strict requirements, also regarding the 
seriousness of the crime.64 It was not enough to list such crimes that are typical for 
organised criminals, because these did not necessarily only include serious crimes.65 
Furthermore not only the abstract listed crime had to be a serious one, but also the 
particular crime in the particular case.66 In the opinion of the BVerfG the penalty of a 
crime reflects how serious the crime is perceived as by the legislative.67 It regards all 
those crimes as sufficient to justify eavesdropping, which have a maximum penalty of 
  
59  At [193]. 
60  At [288]. 
61  At [300]. 
62  At [301]. 
63  At [226]. 
64  At [229]. 
65  At [232]. 
66  At [234] and [235]. 
67  At [238]. 
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more than 5 years detention.68 By this standard, the list of crimes in § 100c III No 3 StPO 
was not limited “serious crimes” and was therefore not constitutional.69  
 
(iv) Standard of suspicion  
Lastly, the court looked at the standard of suspicion required for eavesdropping which 
was “when particular facts justify the suspicion” that one of the listed crimes has been 
committed.70 The court stated that this level of suspicion required more than just the 
existence of clues. It required a specific factual basis of a certain scope and only 
previously investigated facts could be used for this basis.71 The court decided that this 
standard of suspicion was appropriate, because the eavesdropping was a measure of 
collecting evidence, as opposed to a measure of punishment, such as detention, which 
would require a stronger standard of suspicion.72 
3 The dissenting opinion  
Two of the judges on the bench73 in the case filed a joint dissenting opinion that raises 
some interesting concerns in regards to the majority judgment. The dissenting opinion 
focuses on the constitutional change. The dissenting judges were of the opinion that the 
changes made to art 13 GG were unconstitutional because they violated the privacy rights 
guaranteed by art 1 GG.  
 
The judges’ argument can be broken down into two steps. Firstly, they established that 
the plain language of art 13 III GG constituted a violation of the rights to human dignity 
and privacy in your home because it did not provide a high enough protection of the core 
sphere of private life. Secondly, they argued that the level of protection required for these 
constitutional rights should be included in the language of art 13 GG and that the conflict 
with arts 1 I and 79 III GG could not be remedied by a restrictive interpretation or narrow 
executing national provisions.  
 
 Violation of constitutional rights  
  
68  At [238]. 
69  At [225]; not serious enough crimes included: money laundering, bribery, corruption, revelation of state 
secrets, support of a terrorist groups and many more. 
70  § 100c I No 3 StPO.  
71  At [247]. 
72  At [248] and [249]. 
73  There were 8 judges on the bench in total.  
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One of the judges’ main concerns was that it was impossible for the officials to find out 
whether the recording violated the core sphere of private life without first listening to the 
conversation.74 The exclusion of conversations that fall into the private sphere always 
first required a violation of this sphere.75 The officials that were in charge of 
eavesdropping would not be able to “delete” a private conversation from their brains ones 
they had overheard it. The knowledge so acquired would be able to influence the 
investigations. In the eyes of the dissenting judges this constituted an unjustifiable 
violation of the right to privacy in private homes. They furthermore criticised the fact that 
the provision provided for the eavesdropping of conversations of third persons, 
particularly in their own flats, which enabled investigations against persons that were 
previously no suspects.76 
 
 Certainty of the language of art 13 GG  
The judges concluded that art 13 III GG itself did not set high enough limits to protect the 
rights protected in art 13 I GG and art 1 GG, which as such had been accepted by the 
majority of the court as well. The dissenting judges did not agree with the majority of the 
court in that an interpretation of art 13 GG in light of the other constitutional provisions 
lead to the constitutionality of art 13 III GG itself.77 In their opinion the conflict with the 
right to human dignity created by art 13 III GG cannot be  sufficiently resolved by a 
restrictive interpretation of art 13 III GG.78 The dissenting judges alleged that such an 
approach reduced the right to human dignity to a mere tool of interpretation in order to 
make constitutional changes constitutional and that this was not living up to the function 
of the right of human dignity as an absolute limit to intrusions into privacy rights.79 The 
judges furthermore alleged that the interpretation undertaken by the BVerfG amounted to 
a change of the constitutional provision that fell into the responsibility of the 
constitutional law maker to maintain the separation of powers.80 
 
The constitutionality of the constitutional provision can in their view furthermore not be 
remedied by stricter provisions in the code of criminal procedure. Instead, the judges 
found it necessary to include restrictions to protect the core sphere of private life in the 
  
74  At [358].  
75  At [358].  
76  At [363]. 
77  At [365] to [367]. 
78  At [369]. 
79  At [367]. 
80  At [370]. 
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constitutional provision itself in order to maintain clarity and in order to guarantee a 
protection of the human dignity on the constitutional level.81  
 
The dissenting judges concluded:82 
 
Nowadays it seems to be an accepted assumption that with the development of new 
technological devices the application of these devices is to be accepted. But if the 
personal intimate sphere in the form of the private home is no longer a taboo zone, a 
violation of which cannot be justified by security reasons, it is questionable whether 
the image of humanity drawn by such practises is compatible with the order of a free 
democratic state of law.  
4 Evaluation  
The BVerfG in this case had the very difficult task to strike a balance between allowing 
measures to maintain the security of the citizens and protecting the citizens’ right to 
privacy. Because there is no constitutional right to security, the assessment did not so 
much constitute a weighing up of two constitutional rights but rather required the court to 
draw boundaries for the right of privacy. This task was particularly difficult in this case 
because it included the assessment of a constitutional change, which is not an everyday 
type of task, even for the constitutional court. Regarding the changes to art 13 GG one 
can assume that the court was reluctant to find that they were unconstitutional, as the 
change of the constitution is a rare and complicated process.   
 
The criticism of the dissenting judges that even a deleted conversation can influence the 
investigations ones the police took notice of it is well founded. However, the only remedy 
for this problem would be to ban eavesdropping entirely. Eavesdropping is a very 
important investigation measure and often the only hope for the officials to find a lead in 
the case. To remove this measure from the investigations entirely would inhibit the police 
work disproportionately, particularly when keeping in mind that there are procedural 
rules that forbid the use of this information.  
 
The part of the judgment that seems surprising is that the court did not have issues with 
the authorization of the officials to eavesdrop in third persons’ apartments. The intrusion 
into the private sphere through eavesdropping is a very strong measure, as was identified 
  
81  At [360] and [362]. 
82  At [373]. 
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by the BVerfG itself. It is startling that such an intrusive measure can be justified in 
regards to the apartment of a person who is under no suspicion.  
 
Regarding the assessment of the StPO provisions it can be noted that the court undertook 
a very detailed analysis. As a result of this analysis the judges made detailed suggestions 
on what the provisions need to include to protect the privacy of the affected persons 
sufficiently. The judges upheld a higher threshold for the justification of eavesdropping 
measures than the legislative had intended and particularly emphasised the rights to legal 
protection and the core sphere of private life.  
E Legislative Changes Following the Judgment  
After the judgment of the BVerfG, the legislature had to change the StPO in the aspects 
that had been struck down by the court. This was done through legislation passed in June 
2005.83 The following changes were made to ensure the constitutionality of the law:  
 
- The list of crimes included in § 100c was limited to crimes that have a maximum 
penalty of more than 5 years detention. 
- A new § 100c IV stipulates that the eavesdropping measures are only allowed if it 
is guaranteed that no conversations that form part of the core sphere of private life 
are recorded. However, conversations about crimes already committed or crimes 
to be committed in the future are “usually not part of this sphere” under the 
section.  
- A new subsection V was added which requires the officials to interrupt the 
eavesdropping if conversations that are part of the core sphere of private life are 
recorded. Under the subsection, such recordings are to be deleted immediately and 
the knowledge of such recordings cannot be used for the investigations.   
- The new § 100d VIII StPO regulates the notification of the affected persons. The 
exceptions for the protection of a secret agent and the “public security” were 
removed.  
- Lastly, the new provisions provide for the supervision of the responsible court in 
several places.84 
 
  
83  Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Urteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 3. März 2004 (Akustische 
Wohnraumüberwachung).  
84  § 100c VII, 100d IV, §100d X. 
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IV The New Zealand GCSB Amendment Bill  
The second example of a legislative change that introduces increased intrusions of 
privacy is a legislative amendment very recently passed in New Zealand. On the 21 
August 2013 the New Zealand Parliament passed the Government Communications 
Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill (GCSB Amendment Bill). This 
bill changed the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003 which governs 
the powers of the Security Bureau. During the legislative process the concern of the 
public rose regarding the effect of the changes. This concern was caused by the fact that 
the new bill allowed the Security Bureau to employ their measures on New Zealand 
citizens, while the measures had previously been limited to foreigners. This section 
explains the legal changes made to the Act. It looks at the Bill’s effect on the privacy 
rights of New Zealand citizens and draws a comparison to the German case study.  
A The GSCB Act 2003 
The GCSB Act 2003 was part of the New Zealand counter terrorism legislation following 
the 9/11 attacks.85 The Act regulates the objectives and functions of the Bureau, which 
had been established in 1977.86 The measures available to the Bureau for intelligence 
gathering focus on the interception of communications through various technical devices.  
 
The original purpose of the Security Bureau was to provide:87  
 
New Zealand government departments with advice on all matters relating to foreign 
intelligence derived from the interception and exploitation of foreign 
communications and other signals (such as radar). These include radio, satellite and 
other forms of telecommunications (including facsimiles and telephones).  
 
The GCSB focused on foreign intelligence and included no powers regarding New 
Zealand nationals.88 This was made clear by section 14 of the Act:89  
 
14 Interception not to target domestic communications  
Neither the Director, nor an employee of the Bureau, nor a person acting on behalf of 
the Bureau may authorise or take any action for the purpose of intercepting the 
  
85  Cynthia Laberge “To What Extent Should National Security Interests Override Privacy in a post 9/11 
World?” (2008) 3 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review Working Paper Series at 108. 
86  Laberge, above n 85, at 111. 
87  Laberge, above n 85, at 111.  
88  Laberge, above n 85, at 112. 
89  Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, s 14.  
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communications of a person (not being a foreign organisation or a foreign person) 
who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident.  
 
Under section 15 a warrant was needed for all interceptions that required the physical 
instalment of an interception device. Section 16 permitted interception of communication 
without a warrant. The section included several exceptions, one of them regarding private 
communications, stating that communications may be intercepted only if:90  
 
(d) the foreign communications do not contain private communications other than  
     private communications that –  
  (i)  are produced, sent, or received by, or sent to, a foreign organisation or a     
       foreign person; and  
  (ii) contain, or may reasonably be expected to contain, foreign intelligence.  
 
Section 4 of the GCSB Act defines “private communications” as follows:  
 
private communication-  
(a) Means a communication between 2 or more parties made under circumstances 
that may reasonably be taken to indicate that any party to the communication 
desires it to be confined to the parties to the communication; but  
(b) Does not include a communication occurring in circumstances in which any party 
ought reasonably to expect that the communication may be intercepted by some 
other person not having the express or implied consent of any party to do so  
 
Foreign communications were therefore allowed to be intercepted with the exception of 
private conversations, unless the private conversations could be reasonably expected to 
contain foreign intelligence New Zealand citizens on the other hand were entirely 
protected from interception of their communication. It can therefore be noted that the old 
system treated foreigners and citizens differently.  
B The GCSB Amendment Bill 2013 
In August 2013 the GCSB Amendment Bill was passed. This new legislation caused 
much public discussion for several reasons. The main reason was probably that the public 
was not informed sufficiently about the changes that the Amendment Bill brought about. 
Because the section on the exclusion of New Zealand citizens was amended, the public 
feared that the Security Bureau would start spying on New Zealand citizens. The 
  
90  Section 16(2)(d). 
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parliament chose to pass the Bill in a procedure of Parliamentary Urgency, which caused 
further resistance of the public. This type of procedure means that there is less time for 
consultation and submissions, which caused the New Zealand Law Society to be 
concerned that “its use degrades the democratic quality of the legislative process.”91 The 
GCSB Amendment Bill transforms the Security Bureau from a foreign intelligence 
agency to a mixed foreign and domestic intelligence agency.92 Furthermore the 
Amendment allowed the Bureau to pass on the collected data to other government 
agencies.93 
 
The Explanatory Note to the GCSB Amendment Bill names two main reasons for the 
amendments. Firstly, some interpretative issues had been identified in connection with 
the GCSB Act 2003. The amendments were to resolve these issues.94 The second reason 
for changing the functions of the Security Bureau named by the explanatory note is that 
“New Zealand faces a changing security environment in which threats are increasingly 
interconnected and national borders are less meaningful”.95 
 
The Amendments include numerous changes of the GCSB Act 2003 which cannot all be 
covered in this section. The relevant changes for the question of intercepting 
communications are the amendments made to sections 8A to 8C and 14. Sections 8A to 
8C lay out the different functions of the Bureau: information assurance and cybersecurity 
(8A), intelligence gathering and analysis (8B) and co-operation with other entities to 
facilitate their functions (8C).  
 
The changes made to s 14 were the ones that caused the most public concern. This section 
was changed from prohibiting any interception into communications of New Zealand 
citizens to only prohibiting the intercepting of private communications of New Zealand 
citizens. Furthermore this restriction is now limited to the Bureau’s function named in 
section 8B, whereas under the old section 14 “any action for the purpose of intercepting 
the communications of a person who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident” 
was prohibited. Therefore the only activity that remains prohibited in regards to New 
Zealand Citizens is “Intelligence gathering and analysis” of private communications.  
  
91  New Zealand Law Society Submission on the Government Communications Security Bureau and 
Related Legislation Amendment Bill (14.6.2013) at [4]. 
92  New Zealand Law Society, above n 91, at [3]. 
93  New Zealand Law Society, above n 91, at [9]. 
94  Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill Explanatory 
Note at 2. 
95  At 2. 
 21 
 
 
Section 16 now also explicitly prohibits the interception of private communications of 
national citizens and permanent residents:96  
 
(1A) This section –  
(b) does not authorise anything to be done for the purpose of intercepting the private 
communications of a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident of New Zealand.  
 
On the other hand s 16 subs (2)(d) that prohibited the interception of private 
communications of foreigners has been removed, which means that the private sphere of 
foreigners is no longer protected under the GCSB Act.  
 
In summary, the following changes were made that are relevant to individuals’ privacy 
rights:  
 
In regards to New Zealand citizens and permanent residents: 
- The Bureau is now authorised to execute all its powers in regards to non-private 
conversations 
- The bureau is not authorised to gather information under section 8B by 
intercepting private conversations  
 
In regards to foreigners:  
- The Bureau is now authorised to execute all its powers in regards to both private 
and non-private communications  
C The Degree of Intrusion into Privacy Rights  
Unlike in the case of the German legislative change, there has been no case assessing the 
intrusion of privacy rights through the changes made to the GCSB Act. A full legal 
analysis of the possible violations of privacy rights by the change is outside the scope of 
this paper. However, a short summary of the privacy rights existing in New Zealand shall 
be made in order to be able to put the comparison with the German legislation into 
perspective. That way a comparison can be made between the level of balance between 
privacy and security reached by the German legislation on the one hand and by the New 
Zealand legislation on the other hand. The point of interest is in particular, whether the 
fact that the right to privacy in Germany is protected in its written constitution makes a 
  
96  Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill 2013, s 
16(1A). 
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difference for the protection of the privacy rights of its citizens compared to a state like 
New Zealand that does not have a written constitution.  
1 Privacy rights in New Zealand  
There are two main documents regarding privacy rights in New Zealand: The Bill of 
Rights and the Privacy Act 1993. Furthermore there is a tort against invasion of privacy.  
 
 Bill of Rights Act  
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 is part of New Zealand’s un-codified constitution.97 The Act 
confirms fundamental human rights for all persons in New Zealand.98 The main 
difference to a codified constitution, such as the German one, is that the Bill of Rights 
Act does not have a superior position or overriding power in relation to any other national 
legislation. It has the same status as any other statute of the Parliament.99 Therefore, no 
particular requirements apply for its amendment.100 The status of the Act is expressively 
clarified by s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act. The government must have regard to the Bill of 
Rights when enacting legislation and legislation has to be interpreted in the light of the 
rights protected in the Act.101 However, if the government passes legislation that is 
inconsistent with one of the rights, the courts are, due to section 4 of the Bill of Rights 
Act, not able to rule on the invalidity of the legislation.  
 
The Bill of Rights Act does not include a stand-alone privacy right as such. However, s 
21 of the Bill of Rights Act has been interpreted to include “values and interests that 
comprise the concept of privacy.”102 Section 21 was originally created to protect persons 
from “unreasonable search and seizure, whether of the person, property, or 
correspondence or otherwise”.103 According to s 3 of the Bill of Rights Act, the rights are 
applicable to relationships between citizens and state agencies. Section 21 therefore 
protects the citizens from state powers of search. In the watershed case of R v Jefferies,104 
the court acknowledged that physical intrusions into a person’s property did no longer 
sufficiently capture the intrusions of privacy possible in reality. Thomas J stated that 
  
97  Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2004) 
at 3. 
98  Rishworth and others, above n 97, at 1. 
99  Rishworth and others, above n 97, at 2. 
100  Rishworth and others, above n 97, at 2. 
101  Rishworth and others, above n 97, at 3 and 4. 
102  Cross, above n 7, at 149 and Rishworth and others, above n 97, at 420. 
103  Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 21. 
104  R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290. 
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“[e]ssentially, s 21 is concerned to protect those values or interests which make up the 
concept of privacy.”105 In this sense, the rights protected under s 21 include “the right of 
self-determination and control over knowledge about oneself and when, how and to what 
extent it will be imparted.”106 He also recognised that:107 
 
While necessarily phrased in terms of individual values, the community has a direct 
interest in the recognition and protection of this broad right to privacy. It is a valued 
right which is esteemed in modern democratic societies. 
 
While all of the statements made in this case indicate a broad protection of privacy rights 
under s 21, it has not yet been resolved by the courts in how far exactly s 21 protects from 
the intrusion of privacy through, for example, surveillance measures.108  
 
 The Privacy Act 1993  
The second pivotal legislation for privacy rights in New Zealand is the Privacy Act of 
1993. This Act codifies some foundational principles about the collection, use and 
dissemination of personal information by private and public agencies. The Act applies to 
any person in New Zealand.109 According to its long title, the Act’s purpose is “to 
promote and protect individual privacy.” The guidelines set up by the Act comprise 12 
“Information Privacy Principles” which are listed in section 6 of the Act. These 
guidelines include principles on the collection, storage and the correction of data as well 
as limits to the use of the date. Examples are the requirement that personal information 
may only be collected for a lawful purpose and that the individual should be made aware 
that the information is being collected.110  
 
The Act has several weaknesses to it that minimise the protection it actually offers to 
individuals. Firstly, there are numerous exceptions for the principles.111 Secondly, the 
Privacy Act is limited to the aforementioned principles and does not include any rules. It 
  
105  At 319 as per Thomas J. 
106  At 319 as per Thomas J.  
107  At 319 as per Thomas J.  
108  Cross, above n 7, at 150 and 151 and Stephanie Sue-Ling NG “Leave Me Alone! Should the Right of 
Privacy Be Included in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990?” (LLB (Hons) Research Paper, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 2004) at 17. 
109 Stephen Penk “The Privacy Act 1993“ in Stephen Penk and Rosemary Tobin (eds) Privacy Law in New 
Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2010) 49 at 60. 
110  Privacy Act 1993, s 6.  
111  Privacy Act 1993, s 6(4). 
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is very soft legislation with a focus on education and conciliation and does not provide 
any strict principles that individuals could rely on. Thirdly, according to section 66 of the 
Privacy Act an interference with an individual’s privacy is only established if, 
additionally to the breach of one of the principles, there was harm caused to the affected 
individual. Lastly, the principles are not enforceable in Court. Instead, the Act provides 
for a complaints system in front of a Privacy Commissioner.112 
 
 Privacy Tort  
Lastly privacy rights are protected by a privacy tort. This was acknowledged in Hosking v 
Runting,113 where the Court of Appeal established that, for a successful claim under this 
tort, the claimant had to establish that the concerned information could be considered as 
private and that a publicity was given to this information that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person.114 The concept of the tort for invasion of 
privacy is still very young and its exact conditions are yet unclear. 
2 How intrusive is the new GCSB Act? 
The main changes affecting privacy rights brought about by the amendments have 
already been summarised.115 Without conducting a comprehensive legal analysis of 
infringements of the privacy rights provided for in New Zealand, some observations as to 
the protection of privacy under the provisions can be made.  
 
Section 15A(2) lists some requirements that have to be met to allow an interception 
warrant:  
 
- The interception must fulfil a function of the Bureau. 
- The outcome sought to be achieved must justify the particular interception or 
access. 
- The outcome is not likely to be achieved by other means. 
- Satisfactory arrangements are in place to ensure that nothing will be done in 
reliance on the warrant or authorisation beyond what is necessary for the proper 
performance of a function of the Bureau. 
- The nature and consequence of acts done in reliance on the warrant are 
reasonable.  
  
112 Penk, above n 109, at 63 and 78.  
113  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
114  At [117] and Tobin , above n 112, at 85. 
115  At IVB. 
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The Act therefore does require necessity of the measure and reasonableness. However, 
the extensiveness of the GSCB Act raises some concerns. In regards to the extensive 
options for spying on foreigners it can be said that an infringement of privacy rights 
seems possible. If s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act prohibits unreasonable surveillance 
through technological devices, the unrestricted surveillance measures allowed by the 
GCSB Act in regards to foreigners seems problematic. This concerns in particular the 
interception of private communication. In general the different treatment of foreigners 
and citizens in the GCSB Act is a concern.116 It is unclear from the Act how this different 
treatment can be justified.  
 
In regards to New Zealand citizens and residents it is unclear what measures are allowed 
by ss 8A and 8C of the GCSB Act and whether these might include the collection of data. 
Furthermore, while the private communications of New Zealand citizens and residents 
seem to be comprehensively protected by section 14, it is unclear how this protection is 
achieved exactly. For example it is not clarified what happens to private conversations 
that are recorded accidently. While s 23 of the GCSB Act requires the destruction of 
“irrelevant records”, it includes a wide exception for records that are of use for any 
purpose of the Bureau. No provision explicitly requests the deletion of private 
communications. Furthermore, section 15B(a) suggests that there are circumstances under 
which private conversations of New Zealand citizens or residents may in fact be 
intercepted. Yet, it is unclear, under which circumstances this can be the case. Another 
issue with the protection of private conversations is the definition of “private 
communication” in s 4 of the GCSB Act and its subs (2) which excludes content from 
being a private communication if “any party ought reasonably to expect that the 
communication may be intercepted by some other person.”117 Lastly, the GCSB Act does 
not include any regulations on informing the affected persons of the intelligence 
measures, which is one of the principles under the Privacy Act.  
D Comparison to the German Case Study  
Even though the GCSB Act and the German Code of Criminal Procedure fulfil different 
functions, they both represent the movement towards growing measures of surveillance 
and can be compared as indicators of the attitude towards privacy and security in the two 
countries. Comparing the balance struck between privacy and security in the New 
Zealand example on the one hand and the German example on the other hand it can be 
  
116  New Zealand Law Society, above n 91, at [38]. 
117  New Zealand Law Society, above n 91, at [35]. 
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concluded that the protection of privacy rights in New Zealand is considerably weaker 
than in Germany.  
 
Some immediate examples of the different level of protection in these two legislations are 
that the GCSB Act does not provide an independent review system, does not protect the 
private sphere of foreigners and further more allows the exception mentioned above for 
the protection of the private sphere of New Zealand citizens in the definition of “private 
communications”. The mere fact that one party to the conversation might suspect that the 
conversation is being eavesdropped does however not change the fact that the 
conversation might contain highly private content contributed by the persons that do not 
suspect to be under surveillance. The exception therefore results in possibly highly 
personal content being unprotected. Furthermore, the GCSB Act does not include 
regulations on informing the affected persons of the surveillance, on the deletion of 
private content that was recorded accidently and the surveillance measures do not depend 
on the suspicion of any particular crime but merely require that they fulfil one of the 
extensive functions under ss 8A and 8B.118 All of these factors would not comply with 
the requirements set up by the BVerfG in the case on eavesdropping in private homes.   
 
The difference in the level of protection of privacy rights can be ascribed to the fact that 
privacy is a constitutionally protected right in Germany, while New Zealand does have 
constitutional rights as such. The legislative change that was caused in Germany due to 
the constitutional complaints that were made would not be possible in a comparable way 
in New Zealand. The fact that New Zealand does not have a constitutional system with a 
constitutional court leads to a weaker protection of the citizens’ rights. Even if the New 
Zealand courts ascribed s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act the protection of privacy rights in a 
broad sense, the courts would not be able to declare any legislation violating these rights 
to be void.  
 
V  Conclusion 
The significance of the BVerfG judgment is that it raised boundaries for the surveillance 
by the state, which some authors thought never possible.119 The court emphasised and 
further specified the boundaries of the core sphere of private life. This core sphere 
represents the minimum personal liberty absolutely protected by the German constitution 
which cannot be touched by the state. The court clarified how the inviolability of the 
private home is closely linked to this sphere. Apart from this “absolute” sphere, the court 
  
118  GCSB Act 2003, ss 15A(1), 15A(2) and 16(1A).  
119  Waldron, above n 12, at 3. 
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set further guide lines of minimum procedural protection and proportionality between the 
measure and the seriousness of the crime. The judgment shows that even in times of “war 
like emergency”,120 courts are willing to fulfil their role of judicial control and protect 
citizens’ rights of liberty. Even if the balance between liberty and security might have 
shifted towards the latter during the last decades,121 there are boundaries to that process. 
This can at least be said for Germany, which has a well-functioning constitutional 
reviewing process. On the other hand the court also made clear that certain restrictions to 
the inviolability of the home under art 13 I GG are legal. This way the court attempts to 
find a balance between the interests of the state in investigating crimes and the personal 
rights of liberty.  
 
In comparison to the German legislation and assessed according to the standards 
developed by the German constitutional court, the GCSB Act is lacking some important 
regulations to protect the privacy of the affected persons. Some of these deficiencies were 
already present before the GCSB Amendment Bill was passed. However, the 
amendments made increase these deficiencies. The comparison shows that having a 
codified constitution means having a better protection of personal rights. The role of the 
constitutional court in reviewing legislation becomes particularly pivotal in times where 
governments act hastily in order to to address a threat like terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
120  Waldron, above n 12, at 3. 
121  Waldron, above n 12, at 3. 
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